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DALE A. OESTERLE
Federal securities laws prohibit managers from making "material"
misstatements and omissions of fact to investors in their companies.' The
term material connotes a level of significance, importance or weight that
justifies investor attention and reliance.2 The Supreme Court supplements
the standard with a declaration that a material fact does not have to change
an investor's vote or a trade3 and an anticipated event does not have to be
probable to be material if it is of major importance. I have chronicled
elsewhere the problems federal courts have with the over-breadth of the
definition,5 but a series of three recent cases on bankruptcy planning are the
breach in the levee.
It almost goes without saying that all investors, reasonable or
otherwise, will be hugely interested if the management of a company in
which they hold stock or bonds is contemplating filing for bankruptcy. On
the filing, stocks will lose most of their value and debt goes into default.
There is nothing more significant to an investor than this. Yet, amazingly,
in three federal court cases, two of which are fairly recent, a management's
discussions of bankruptcy are held, in essence,6 not to be material to
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' The fraud prohibitions are sprinkled throughout the statutes and laws. The best
known is in Rule lOb-5. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2013).
2 Rule 405 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1933 and 12b-2 under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, for example, defines material as "those matters to
which there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would attach
importance." See, e.g., id. §§ 230.405, 240.12b-20.
3 TSC Indus. Inc. v. Northway Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (explaining that a
fact is material if it "would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of
the reasonable [investor]" or it "would have been viewed by the reasonable investor
as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available"); id.
at 449 (explaining that materiality "does not require proof that [accurate] disclosure
... would have caused the reasonable investor to change his vote"); see Basic Inc.
v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988) (dealing with allegations of a misleading
proxy statement). A subsequent opinion applied the language to all corporate
disclosures affecting trading in the company's securities.
4 Id. at 236 (adopting the test of Judge Friendly in SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulfur Co., 401
F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (the necessary probability of an event of materiality
slides backwards in light of its magnitude)).
5 Dale A. Oesterle, The Overused and Under-Defined Notion of "Material" in
Securities Law, 14 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 167 (2011).6 There are judicial tricks that obscure the finding, noted in the discussion infra.
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investors? And equally astonishingly, the cases have been greeted by the
securities bar with barely a ripple of discontent.8 How can this be?
The cases offer undeniable evidence of the basic proposition that
materiality is a highly qualified term and that these qualifications have yet
to be defined or, for that matter, even recognized.
I. THE CASES
A. In re Tower Automotive Securities Litigation
Tower Automotive Inc., a supplier of automotive parts, filed for
bankruptcy protection on February 2, 2005.9 Investors who had purchased
Tower securities in a five-year period previous to the bankruptcy filing sued
as a class, claiming various violations of Rule lOb-5. One of their claims
was based on Tower's failure to disclose active bankruptcy planning three
months prior to the filing. The complaint charged that, based on the CEO's
deposition testimony, the company was working on contingency plans for a
bankruptcy filing in October of 2004. Moreover, the complaint alleged that
Tower's public statements from October to February were materially
misleading because the statements did not mention the bankruptcy
planning. In the statements, Tower indicated that it was "pursuing options
for easing the company's liquidity problems, including pursuing (and later
obtaining) an accounts receivable securitization facility and deferring a
dividend payment."o
The District Court dismissed the claim on two grounds. As is often
seen in materiality cases, the logic is curious to the point of comedy
because the real reasons for the holding are in the background, unstated.
First, the court held that "[b]ecause Tower disclosed its intensive efforts to
ameliorate the company's liquidity problem, the lack of disclosure
regarding its bankruptcy planning did not transform its disclosure during
this period into misrepresentations."" Apparently, the bankruptcy filing
should not have surprised investors given the company's known efforts to
marshal cash. But, as any savvy businessperson will tell you, a company's
efforts to marshal cash are a far cry from planning for an imminent
bankruptcy filing. Despite these inconsistencies, judges in the Southern
7 There were some early cases that did find bankruptcy plans to be material. See In
re McLeodUSA Inc., No. C02-001-MWB, 2004 WL 1070570 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 31,
2004); Salkind v. Wang, No. 93-10912-WGY, 1995 WL 170122 (D. Mass. Mar.
30, 1995).
8 See, e.g., Richard J. Corbi, Nondisclosure ofPlanned Corporate Bankruptcy Does
Not Violate Federal Securities Law, AM. BANKR. INST. J., July/Aug. 2009.
9 The facts are from In re Tower Auto., 483 F. Supp. 2d 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
'
0 Id. at 348.
" Id. (citing Time Warner Inc., 9 F.3d 259, 267 (2d Cir. 1993)).
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District of New York are known for their business acumen. Moreover, the
court, in a motion to dismiss must view all pleaded facts in the light most
favorable to the plaintiffs.
Second, the court, planting the seed for future cases as we will see
below, held that the claim did not adequately plead the element of scienter:
No multi-billion dollar company would file for bankruptcy
without first engaging in internal deliberations regarding its
course of action, and Tower was apparently no exception to
this rule. However, 'in the absence of any factual
allegations from which one can infer that defendants had
actually settled upon the details' of the bankruptcy plan in
advance of the filing, Plaintiffs' allegations fail to evince
any hint of fraudulent intent.12
Management's disclosures are not fraudulent if management knows of an
imminent bankruptcy filing but does not know of its "settled . . . details."
Most bankruptcy plans, other than pre-packaged bankruptcies, evolve
significantly after the filing, as management, if still in control as a debtor in
possession, puts a plan of reorganization before the creditor committees.
Nothing much is settled on filing. Why is a plan to file within a short time
period not sufficient detail? A plan to merge, without settled details, is
sufficiently material in Basic.'3
The case of Beleson v. Schwartz provides some answers.14 Loral
Space & Communications, Ltd. was in severe financial distress in early
2003.' The company hired an investment bank, Greenhill & Co., to find
possible merger partners. Harvey Miller, a partner at Weil, Gotshal &
Manges, LLP and one of the country's foremost bankruptcy specialists, was
on the Greenhill advising team.17 A serious buyer emerged, Intelsat Ltd.,
who demanded in May of 2003 that Loral file a prepackaged bankruptcy to
clear title to its satellites before any asset transfer.'8 On May 30th, Loral
and Intelsat agreed that the Intelsat sale, if finalized, would be completed in
bankruptcy.19 Loral hired Weil, Gotshal & Manges as bankruptcy counsel
and continued to look for alternatives. 20 On July 15th, Loral and Intelsat
12 Id. (citing Fant v. Perelman, 1999 WL 199078, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 1999)).
" See generally Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
14 419 Fed. App'x. 38 (2d Cir. 2011).
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signed an asset purchase agreement and Loral filed immediately for Chapter
11 bankruptcy.21
The Plaintiffs, those who had purchased securities from June 30th
through July 15th filed a class action against the Loral CEO alleging Rule
1Ob-5 violations.22 The plaintiffs alleged four statements made during the
period that were materially misleading in light of the bankruptcy plans.23
Three of the four statements were positive accounts of major Loral business
transactions: a settlement with a major creditor, an accelerated collection of
a large accounts receivable, and a major contract to build space station
24
replacement batteries. One statement was from the CEO stating that Loran
was "on plan" to have $65 million in cash by year's end.25 All of the
statements were technically true; they just did not mention the impending
bankruptcy negotiations. It was like the Captain of the Titanic telling guests
the pork tenderloin was good in the dining hall after he had struck the
iceberg.
The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment.2 6 The court's initial reasoning is somewhat defensible. The
market already knew, during the class period, that Loral was in deep
financial trouble.2 7 The stock had plummeted to its all-time lOW2 8 and its
bonds were trading at twenty cents on the dollar.2 9 The plaintiffs were not
misled because they knew the truth. The guests on the Titanic saw and
heard the collision with the iceberg before considering the pork tenderloin.
One wonders, however, whether an all-time low of $3.01 on July
14th,30 would not have been $.20 or so with a prior disclosure of a pending
bankruptcy on May 30th. In any event, we will never know, as fact-finding
was terminated with a summary judgment motion.
The reasoning gets slippery quickly, however. First, the court noted
that the negotiations with Intelsat remained uncertain until the last minute
in July.31 The parties were resolving difficult issues up until they signed on
July 15th.32 This argument would not have worked with the Supreme Court
in Basic had there been just an asset agreement and no bankruptcy filing.
As I understand the directive in Basic, the May 30th agreement had to be
2 1 Id. at 522.
22 id
23 Id. at 522-23.
24 See id.
25 Beleson v. Schwartz, 419 Fed. App'x. 39 (2d Cir. 2011).
26 599 F. Supp. 2d at 528.
27 419 Fed. App'x. at 40.
28 599 F. Supp. 2d at 522.
29 419 Fed. App'x. at 40.
30 599 F. Supp. 2d at 522.31 Id. at 526.
32 id
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disclosed in any major public statement or required public filing made
subsequently by Loral. Why does the bankruptcy filing make a difference?
Second, and here is the rub, the court said the following:
Such an outcome is further supported by the public policy
justifications for allowing a company operating near
insolvency to make careful deliberations about its future,
free from any obligation to disclose potential bankruptcy. .
. . Any standard mandating disclosure of contingent
bankruptcy planning would put an unacceptable burden on
corporations and their officers. Such a standard might
amount to a self-fulfilling prophecy, ensuring that all
companies that begin contingent preparations for
bankruptcy would inevitably go bankrupt because, upon
disclosure of the plans, investors would immediately lose
confidence in the company and close the capital markets. In
some cases, a rule requiring disclosure of bankruptcy plans
might prematurely foreclose other options the company
may be contemplating that could restore its financial
viability and thus avert bankruptcy.33
There it is: the previously unstated policy argument behind the technical
arguments finding a lack of materiality or a lack of scienter in bankruptcy
planning cases. And the argument makes business sense.
But the language does not comport with the language of Basic, in
which Justice Blackmun gives the back of his hand to a similar argument
for keeping merger discussions quiet until a merger agreement has been
signed: "we think that creating an exception to a regulatory scheme founded
on a pro-disclosure legislative philosophy, because complying with the
regulation might be 'bad for business,' is a role for Congress, not this
Court."34 In any event, decorum is restored when the Second Circuit, in an
unsigned Summary Order affirms the trial court holding only that
"[n]otwithstanding the positive business developments reported in the
statements upon which plaintiff relies, the market was adequately informed
of the dire nature of Loral's financial condition."3 5
It is hard to keep a good reason down, however. In the next and
latest case on bankruptcy discussions, Hutchinson v. Perez, another plaintiff
class suffered a motion to dismiss.36 The plaintiffs alleged that executives
of Kodak had made false and misleading statements about Kodak's
financial condition in the one-year period leading up to its bankruptcy filing
33 Id. at 527.
34 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988).
35 Beleson v. Schwartz, Fed. App'x. 38, 40 (2d Cir. 2011).
36 No. 12 Civ. 1073(HB), 2012 WL 5451258, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2012).
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on January 19, 2012.x The plaintiffs listed various statements made by the
executives during the period that, among other things, trumpeted the
company's "digital transformation,"08 anticipated positive results for
2012,3 and assured investors that Kodak had "sufficient financial
resources." 4 0 Kodak struggled to raise cash.4 1
The company's share price declined to $.78 a share in late
September when Kodak confirmed publicly, less than four months before it
filed for bankruptcy, it had hired a law firm known for bankruptcy
restructuring and that it had "no intention" of filing for bankruptcy. 42
The Court held that the plaintiffs had failed to allege scienter and
that the statements were not material. The Court based its holding on the
failure to allege scienter on the plaintiffs' failure to allege specific
contradictory information was available to the defendants at the same time
they made their misleading statements.4 3 The Court refused to construe
statements contained in the bankruptcy filing detailing the events of the
previous year as specific contradictory information. The bankruptcy
declaration included an acknowledgment that in September, at the time of
the "no intention" statement, Kodak had begun to consider bankruptcy as an
option "among others . . . while at the same time it pursued other
alternatives to avoid it[.]""
So if executives are actively engaged in planning a bankruptcy
contingency, they can deny it as long as they are pursuing actively and
aggressively other options and the markets have multiple warnings of the
company's severe financial difficulties. Any claim of scienter is "'fraud in
hindsight,' [a complaint] filed after a company's bankruptcy based on the
conclusory allegation that defendants had or should have been aware of the
'liquidity crisis."4 5
To support the argument the judge cited the "public policy
justifications" language in the lower court opinion in Beleson v. Schwartz46
noted above. The judge also added a footnote citing a quotation from
37 Id. at *1.38 The company, a global giant when camera film dominated photography, was
attempting to restructure itself to compete in the digital age. Id.
39 The CEO notes in an earnings conference call, for example: "[w]e are committed
to finish with [sic] this transformation in the year 2012. And our strategy had not
changed and we have the resources to execute it[.]" Id. at *2.
40 Id at *1.
41 id
42 Id. at *2.
43 Id. at *6. The Court put the word "specific" in italics. Id.
4 Id. at *5.
4 Id at *746 Id at *8.
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Professor Pritchard in the Wall Street Journal.4 7 "Fully informed securities
markets aren't the only goal in this world,' said Adam Pritchard, a
University of Michigan law professor and former SEC attorney. "If
disclosure is destroying businesses, well, how is that good for anyone?" 8
Professor Pritchard may be correct on policy but his view does not comport
with the language of Basic v. Levinson. Lawyers in Basic argued that early
disclosure destroyed acquisition deals that were good for everyone, and
they lost. 49
The court did reach materiality in dicta and "noted" that many of
the alleged statements were either forward-looking statements protected by
the "safe harbor" provision of the PLSRA50 or were not material as
"statements of corporate optimism and puffery."5'
II. THE POLICY
There can be no doubt that the issue of when a publicly-traded
company must disclose its plans to file for bankruptcy is a thorny question.
At present, firms appear to have a path to refuse disclosure prior to the
filling itself. A firm in distress may hire bankruptcy advisors from
investment banks and law firms and discuss bankruptcy plans without
disclosing the discussions or plans if the company: discloses specific details
of financial distress; documents a continuing effort to pursue alternatives to
bankruptcy until the eve of the bankruptcy filing; and makes general
positive statements to hold the investors. The company may file for
bankruptcy with a simultaneous public announcement and a federal court
will grant a summary motion in favor of a company and its officers and
against private plaintiffs who held their securities until the filing.5 2
The policy argument is straightforward. Any disclosure of a firm
considering a bankruptcy filing will usually doom a struggling firm to file
immediately. Investors, customers and suppliers will bolt on the public
announcement. The counter-argument, that investors have a right to all
material information on all public communications by a firm in distress,
seems to have a hollow ring in such circumstances.
47 Id. at *8 n.4 (citing Mike Spector, Keeping Mum about the 'B Word', WALL ST.
J. (Nov. 7, 2012, 7:33 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324073504578105121863526076.
html).
48 Spector, supra note 47.
49 See generally Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
50 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(i)(1)(A)-(B) (2012).
5 Hutchinson, 2012 WL 5451258, at *8.
52 Or who held their securities until after the last big price drop before the filing.
s3 For an argument that public disclosure of a potential threat of bankruptcy filing is
required in public finance, see Robert A. Fippinger, Securities Law Disclosure
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Added to the need to exempt bankruptcy discussion from disclosure
is the practical effect of a plaintiff class that survives a motion to dismiss or
a motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs' primary claim is against a
company in bankruptcy and any settlement or recovery, if allowed, would
come at the expense of other aggrieved investors. The claim is, in essence, a
claim by the plaintiffs for an advantage in bankruptcy over where they
would otherwise be.54 But the Bankruptcy Code protects senior classes of
claimants from fraud claims by shareholders.55 The protection does not
apply to SEC actions under the Fair Funds Provisions of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 when the SEC makes distributions to aggrieved
shareholders. 6 It is unlikely, that within the shareholder class of claimants,
defrauded shareholders will be able to secure an advantage over other
shareholders through private litigation.57
Exempting the firm based on a view that such a jump in priority is
not merited will still leave the executives who made the offending
statements vulnerable. If vulnerable, to protect their personal pocket
books, 8 they will clam up when even a whiff of bankruptcy is in the air and
this sudden silence, of course, will be tantamount to a public admission that
bankruptcy planning is in the picture. Once again, the silence of once
optimistic executives will lead to abandonment by investors, customers and
suppliers. The silence, unnatural in the marketing rich atmosphere of the
modern business world, will itself force an immediate bankruptcy filing. In
a sense, businesses want to protect their need to portray a business as usual
front while bankruptcy planning is in the background.
III. CONCLUSION
The policy arguments are not novel or unexpected. What is odd,
however, is how the federal government reconciles the competing
Requirements for the Political Subdivision Threatened with Bankruptcy, 10
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 541, 594 (1981).
54 For a discussion of this problem, see Wendy S. Walker et al., At the Crossroads:
The Intersection of the Federal Securities Laws and the Bankruptcy Code, 63 Bus.
LAW. 125 (2007).
1 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 510(b), 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2012); see also In re Stirling Homex
Corp., 579 F.2d 206, 213-14 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, sub nom. Jezarian v.
Raichle, 439 U.S. 1074 (1979).
56 See In re Adelphia Commc'ns. Corp., 327 B.R. 143 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005),
appeal dismissed, sub nom.; see also In re Adelphia Commc'ns. Corp. 222 F.
App'x. 7 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, sub nom. Official Comm. of Unsecured
Creditors v. Adelphia Commc'ns. Corp., 552 U.S. 941 (2007).
1 The bankruptcy filing generally stays litigation against the debtor. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(a). Moreover, a claim of fraud is unlikely to augment their claim of loss in
the value of their shares against other shareholders.
58 A claim for indemnification under such circumstances, from an insolvent
company, is weak solace.
Bankruptcy Planning Is Not Material?
arguments by absurdly strict scienter pleading standards and patently false
holdings that the bankruptcy discussions are not material to investors.
Surely there is a better way, by rule or statute, to create an exemption to our
general disclosure rules based on business exigency.
Courts use the same odd reasoning on other types of painful
disclosures. When a publicly traded company, particularly a financial
company, receives a "Wells Notice" from the Securities and Exchange
Commission, 59 a disclosure of the Wells Notice can threaten the life of the
company. In reasoning eerily similar to the bankruptcy discussion cases,
courts have held both that failure to disclose a Wells Notice is not a
material omission and that such a claim is not an adequate pleading of
scienter. 60 Reasonable investors, if asked, would certainly respond with a
wish to have such information for their "deliberations." Courts are using the
materiality doctrines and pleading doctrines to delay disclosure of the SEC
investigation until the investigation is more certain to result in filed charges.
Again, there is merit in the position, but an abuse of the doctrines of
materiality and scienter is an odd avenue for government expression of the
policy.
Hopefully the time for ad hoc judicial stretching of the basic rules
on materiality and pleading to vindicate sensible business concerns in the
context of mandatory government disclosure rules will soon collapse on its
own weight in a fit of realism. Then the real work can begin and sensible
people in Congress and the SEC can debate and reconcile the competing
interests of businesses that have valid reasons for disclosing less and
investors who want and need a critical quantum of information.
Decision makers could start their investigation by reviewing stock
exchanges rules. Stock exchanges around the world have long had rules that
61parse carefully-crafted exceptions to a general disclosure obligation.
5 The SEC provides a target of an investigation with a Wells Notice whenever the
Enforcement Division staff decides, even preliminary, to recommend that the SEC
Commissioners bring charges. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(c) (2013). SEC
rules provide the company an opportunity to make a "Wells Submission" to the
Commissioners detailing why they should reject the staff s recommendation.60 See Richman v. Goldman Sachs Grp. Inc., 868 F. Supp. 2d 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).61 The rules are discussed in Oesterle, supra note 5, at 194 nn.151-54.
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